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The U.S. economy has undergone a 
fundamental shift in structure in the 
last three decades toward becoming an 
innovation economy. This shift has created 
enormous untapped potential, which can only 
be realized by learning to trade in ideas. But 
rather than advancing and adopting policies 
to promote this new driver of economic 
growth, U.S. policymakers have continued to 
live in a pre-innovation economy paradigm 
and are considering legislation that would 
hamper the market for ideas. 
 Innovation, loosely defined, is invention 
followed by commercialization. Trade in 
inventions leads to more efficient and wider-
ranging commercialization, and is made 
vastly easier when inventions are associated 
with property rights, particularly patents. 
RENEWING THE FOUNDATION FOR 
GROWTH
U.S. GDP is currently $18.4 trillion, with a real 
growth rate of 1.1%.1 Using estimates from 
the economic literature, a mature market for 
patents could generate 5% additional annual 
growth for the U.S.—that is, this one market 
could single-handedly restore GDP growth 
back to levels last seen in the 1980s.2
 Unfortunately, the first crucial 
foundation for the market for ideas—the 
patent office—is drastically underfunded. 
 There are currently around 2.5 million 
active patents available to be traded, with 
likely around 1 million patents caught 
in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) backlog. The average time needed 
to process a patent application peaked at 
around 3.5 years before the introduction of 
the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011 and 
now stands at just over 2 years.3 
 The USPTO spends an average of just 
18 hours per patent application. Lemley 
argues that there should be a balance 
between expending resources in reviewing 
applications and allowing the courts to 
address problematic patents.4 But given 
pervasive claims of excessive patent 
litigation, reports that between one-
third and one-half of all litigated patents 
are found invalid, the backlog of patent 
applications, and the low level of review 
by patent examiners, it is likely that patent 
quality is inefficiently low.
 The USPTO’s budget request for 2017 is 
around $3.3 billion. But, unlike other federal 
agencies, the USPTO is not supported by 
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This one market could 
single-handedly restore 
GDP growth to levels 
last seen in the 1980s.
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patent owners. Pushing crippling regulation 
onto this nascent free market will sacrifice 
one of America’s best hopes for growth in 
the new economic era. 
ENDNOTES
 1. See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 2. See Jay Walker, “The Real Patent Crisis 
Is Stifling Innovation,” Forbes, June 18, 2014. 
The article quotes a Forester Research report 
that states: “U.S. firms annually waste $1 
trillion [about 5.5% of GDP] in underused 
intellectual property assets by failing to 
extract the full value of that property through 
partnerships.” Also see “How do you find a 
manufacturer to license your product?” U.S. 
News & World Report, June 10, 2002, which 
states that $120 billion of licensing activity 
took place in 2002. If this value has increased 
with inflation, and any increase has surely 
been much more dramatic, this would be 
0.85% of today’s GDP.
 3. See https://www.uspto.gov/aia_
implementation/bills-112hr1249enr.pdf.
 4. Mark Lemley, “Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office,” Northwestern University 
Law Review 95, no. 4 (2000).
 5. Section 22 of the AIA allowed the 
patent office to deposit excess fees into a 
reserve fund, which would be available for 
use in the event of a government shutdown. 
Prior to the introduction of the AIA, the 
Congressional Research Service estimated 
that Congress had diverted more than $1 
billion of the patent office’s fees between 
1990 and 2011. See Glenn J. McLoughlin, 
“U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
Appropriations Process: A Brief Explanation,” 
Congressional Research Service (7-5700, 
RS20906), 2014.
 6. “Research and development (R&D)—
Gross domestic spending on R&D—OECD 
Data” at data.oecd.org.
 7. See https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/114/s632/summary.
 8. There is scant evidence that patent 
trolls are a systematic problem. The courts, 
the Federal Trade Commission, and the 
Department of Justice have been aggressively 
pursuing instances of patent trolling. See, for 
example, Joe Mullin, “In a first, East Texas 
judge hits patent troll with attorneys’ fees,” 
ARS Technica, Dec. 20, 2015.
appropriations. The USPTO collects its budget 
in fees and then must ask Congress if it can 
keep them.5 Each year, the U.S. spends half a 
trillion dollars on research and development, 
but the government does not spend a cent to 
provide inventors with high-quality, tradable 
property rights.6
CURRENT LEGISLATION HINDERS 
GROWTH
The majority of large high-technology firms 
are publicly traded, have a short-term 
focus, and view patents as more of a costly 
nuisance than the long-term foundation 
of their business. Perhaps in response to 
lobbying from this group, bills like H.R. 9 “The 
Innovation Act,” S. 1137 “PATENT Act,” H.R. 
2045 “Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters 
Act of 2015,” and H.R. 1832 “Innovation 
Protection Act” have been introduced 
before the 114th Congress. Each of these 
bills intentionally weakens the enforcement 
of patents, making it easier to ignore and 
infringe them. Only S. 632 “STRONG Patents 
Act of 2015”7 is more balanced. 
 These bills often use patent trolls—
those exerting patents in bad faith—as an 
excuse to make litigation harder and so 
infringement easier.8 Meanwhile, patent 
owners legitimately exerting their patents 
are having their rights curtailed, and patent 
intermediaries, who act as market makers 
for the market for ideas, are discouraged 
from entry. The second crucial foundation of 
the market for ideas—the ability to trade in 
patents—is being undermined.  
CONCLUSION
A market for ideas encourages specialization 
in invention, matches inventions to their 
most efficient forms of commercialization, 
and broadens the range of products available 
to consumers. It is also an economic force in 
and of itself that may be capable of single-
handedly restoring U.S. prosperity.
 To harness the power of the market for 
ideas, the U.S. must do two things: it must 
fund the patent office to 21st century levels, 
and it must bring the market for ideas out 
from behind closed doors in a way that 
enhances, rather than curtails, the rights of 
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